Investigações e obtenção de provas de cartel: por que e como observar paralelismo de conduta
- Authors
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Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos
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Claudio Roberto Fóffano Vasconcelos
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- Keywords:
- Preços, Trustes
- Abstract
- Market models about non-cooperative games repeated infinitely have been used as an indication of how to improve the cartels detection methodology. In the specific case of price parallelism, the legal rule is that this conduct is not enough to prove collusive agreement, since in the games terminology it doesn’t provide the differentiation between profit joint maximization equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Following this rule, the central object of this paper was to offer a methodology contribution from the dynamic models to the tacit or secret collusion proofs, admitting that parallelism is an evidence of concurrence infraction. Starting from the price parallelism model, it is indicated a complementary method of temporal series, to identify the causal and a long run relation of the strategic variables in cartels.
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- Issue
- Vol. 26 No. 2 (2005)
- Section
- Artigos
- License
- A remessa dos artigos à revista implica a cessão dos direitos autorais à FEE.